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GPOS AND THE HEALTH CARE SUPPLY CHAIN:
MARKET-BASED SOLUTIONS AND REAL-WORLD
RECOMMENDATIONS TO REDUCE PRICING
SECRECY AND BENEFIT HEALTH CARE
PROVIDERS
Carl A. Johnston, Ph.D. * and Curtis D. Rooney, Esq.
In An Empirical Analysis of Aftermarket Transaction by Hospitals, the
authors Robert E. Litan, Hal J. Singer, and Anna Birkenbach suggest public
policy changes to the law governing hospital group purchasing organizations
(GPOs). Their recommendations, however, appear to be based on a
common fallacy and on selective data. Therefore, their conclusions are
questionable. In response, we address their arguments, raise questions about
the data used, and make our own public policy recommendations that
promise to save the health care industry billions of dollars without disrupting
the current system. We strongly believe Congress should pursue our
important recommendations.
In the spirit of public debate, we asked the authors to provide us the data
on which they based their published conclusions, so that we could
empirically test the veracity of these figures for ourselves. Confidentiality
clauses in the authors' contract with the company providing the information
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1. Robert E. Litan, Hal J. Singer & Anna Birkenbach, An Empirical Analysis of
Aftermarket Transactions by Hospitals, 28 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 23, 37-38
(2011).
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reportedly prohibit dissemination of the relevant data. As a result, our
options were to either: (1) invest considerable resources to purchase the data
from its purveyor to review, verify, or disprove the accuracy of the data by
observation or experiment; or (2) attempt to rebut the findings of the study
without the benefit of the data. Lacking the requisite resources, we
undertake the latter course.
As a result, we provide an analysis of the authors' arguments and suggest
that both the aftermarket and GPO market offer hospitals and other health
care providers important alternatives for cost-reduction strategies. Rather
than enacting the potentially disruptive public policy prescriptions of the
authors-changes that would only benefit medical device manufacturers to
the detriment of hospitals, patients, physicians, and taxpayers-we offer a
market-based public policy alternative regarding the secrecy of medical
device product pricing, from which hospitals and other health care providers
would benefit.
Published in the most recent edition of this Journal, the original article
contains the following Editor's note: "A 2010 unpublished study by the
authors addressed the topic of group purchasing organizations ("GPOs") and
their effect on health care costs. The following article presents new
methodology and data to support the authors' views."3
It should be noted, however, that two of the authors did publish a similar
work based on economic and antitrust arguments containing a nearly
identical title, theories, and conclusions. The report is entitled Do Group
Purchasing Organizations Achieve the Best Prices for Member Hospitals?
An Empirical Analysis ofAftermarket Transactions.4
This piece, funded by the Medical Device Manufacturers Association
(MDMA), has been used in conjunction with the group's efforts to alter
public policy in favor of the $200 billion medical device industry.
Moreover, questions remain regarding the data used in the aforementioned
study and how it was obtained and funded. These questions are all the more
important in light of MDMA's longstanding opposition to GPOs, including
various tactics such as public relations, litigation, and financial support for
non-peer reviewed academic studies of questionable value.
The earlier report by Litan and Singer, in summary, is based on two
claims: (1) GPO compensation through vendor payments gives a strong
2. See id. at 29 n.29.
3. Id. at 23 ed's n.
4. Press Release, Med. Device Mfrs. Ass'n, GPOs Fail to Secure the Best Prices for
Patients and Hospitals (Oct. 6, 2010), available at www.medicaldevices.org/node/795.
732012
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incentive to hospitals and GPOs to overpay for medical devices to the
detriment of Medicare and Medicaid, forcing competitors out of the market;
and (2) that so-called aftermarket transactions conducted after completion of
a GPO agreement yield prices that are substantially lower, showing that
GPOs do not achieve cost-savings.
The first argument was summarily dismissed by the 8th Circuit Court of
Appeals' holding in Southeast Missouri v. C.R. Bard, Inc.5 In fact, the court
described one of the authors' expert reports in this case as lacking any
empirical support.6 The report was also rejected as "unbelievable" by
practitioners in the field, including the Mayo Clinic, New York-
Presbyterian, BJC Healthcare, Memorial Hermann, and other large
hospitals.
The second argument, unfortunately, falls prey to a post hoc ergo propter
hoc fallacy. Specifically, the authors come to their public policy conclusion
based solely on the order of events, rather than taking into account other
factors that might rule out the connection. In other words, any cost savings
found in the aftermarket studied here are based on the fact that the selected
items have already been subjected to the rigors of the GPO market. Rather
than disabling the GPO market through public policy changes, as the authors
and the medical device community suggest here, the more prudent course is
to celebrate and support cost containment methods.
The authors' conclusion, that the GPO funding mechanism of supplier-
paid administrative fees should be changed because the aftermarket auctions
provide greater savings than the GPO market, fails to take into account the
reported experience of the nation's purchasing professionals. In fact,
purchasing professionals from many of the largest health systems in the
United States rejected the authors' public policy prescriptions in a letter
stating: "changing the current GPO funding mechanism would mean
5. Se. Mo. Hosp. v. C.R. Bard Inc., 642 F.3d. 608, 616-17 (8th Cir. 2011).
6. Id. at 616-18 (affirming a district court's grant of summary judgment dismissing
a hospital's claim that a medical device company's contract with a GPO violated antitrust
laws. The plaintiffs' expert asserted that GPO purchasing power could allow GPOs to
impose a small but significant non-transitory increase in price, but the Court found that
plaintiffs' expert had failed to provide any facts-or even anecdotal evidence-to support
the plaintiffs' claims).
7. Letter from fourteen of the nation's largest hospitals (including Mayo Clinic,
New York-Presbyterian Hosp., Mem'l Hermann, et al.) to Eamonn P. Hobbs, Chairman
of the Board, Med. Device Mfr. Ass'n (Dec. 13, 2010) (on file with author).
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additional costs for hospitals and other health care organizations, thus
driving health care expenditures even higher."8
In the Journal article, the authors' thesis is summarized as follows:
If a GPO is receiving an administrative fee equal to a percentage
of the proceeds, the GPO's incentive to seek out the lowest prices
for hospitals is weakened. Moreover, in the presence of
administrative fees, medical suppliers might be induced to bid less
aggressively on price, as some of their resources are shifted
towards competing for the largest administrative fee. The resulting
diminution of competition might raise net costs for hospitals and
government-which reimburses hospital expenses through
Medicare, Medicaid, and other programs-despite the savings in
transaction costs and consolidation of purchasing power made
possible by GPOs.9
In response, we take on these arguments in turn and address its
conclusions below. Before we address these matters, however, we must first
accurately describe the complicated work of the GPO.
I. HOW GPOs WORK
For purposes of illustration, St. Francis Med. Ctr. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., a
federal court case, provides a detailed review of how hospitals utilize GPOs
to purchase supplies and services and how GPOs work:' 0
A GPO is a purchasing intermediary that negotiates contracts for
medical supplies on behalf of its member hospitals . . . Hospitals
voluntarily belong to GPOs to obtain (i) better prices and services
from the vendors on contract, (ii) lower expenses associated with
having to negotiate and administer purchasing contracts, (iii)
assistance with resolving product failures,... [etc.].1
GPOs provide cost-saving methods to hospitals and other health care
providers by aggregating their purchasing power. GPOs aggregate hospital
supply demands to achieve lower prices similar to more familiar consumer-
oriented services, such as Groupon or LivingSocial. Often owned by their
8. Id.
9. Litan, Singer & Birkenbach, supra note 1, at 25.
10. See St. Francis Med. Ctr. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 657 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1079-1105
(E.D. Mo. 2009).
11. Id. at 1078.
2012 75
76 The Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy Vol. XXIX: 1
hospital members, the function of the GPOs is to drive down rising health
care costs in a highly disaggregated market. Congress, the courts, and
antitrust agencies have long recognized the competitive benefits of group
purchasing arrangements. 12 Although the price benefits of GPOs are an
important feature, their business model is more broadly based.' 3
GPOs serve numerous functions, both organizational and economic, that
allow hospitals to use purchasing power to resolve unique challenges in the
health care market. 14 GPOs do not take title to the supplies purchased by
their hospital or health care provider members or customers. Rather, GPOs
create portfolios of contracts, often with 3-year term durations (with 60 to 90
day termination clauses),' 5 that include relationships with wholesaler-
distributors. The wholesaler-distributor takes title to the product and is
responsible for the delivery of the product to the facility.' These portfolios
of contractual relationships are offered to hospitals and other health care
providers. Because GPO members and/or customers are most often its
owner and/or shareholder, its interests and incentives are aligned.
A. Bids and Requests For Information
The contract process begins when the typical GPO posts a "bid calendar"
on a website to announce the time frame that they will be entertaining offers
from suppliers of goods and services. Interested suppliers are invited to
12. See Robert E. Bloch, Scott P. Perlman & Jay S. Brown, An Analysis of Group
Purchasing Organizations' Contracting Practices Under Antitrust Laws: Myth and
Reality, Sept. 26, 2003, FTC Healthcare Hearings, available at http://www.ftc.gov/ogc/
healthcarehearings/docs/030926bloch.pdf; see also Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v.
Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 295 (1985); D.O.J. & F.T.C., STATEMENTS
OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT POLICY IN HEALTH CARE, STATEMENT 7- JOINT PURCHASING
ARRANGEMENTS AMONG HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS 66 (Aug. 1996).
13. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-738, GROUP PURCHASING
ORGANIZATIONS: SERVICES PROVIDED To CUSTOMERS AND INITIATIVES REGARDING THEIR
BUSINESS PRACTICES 2 (2010) [hereinafter GAO-10-738].
14. Eugene S. Schneller, The Value of Group Purchasing in the Health Care Supply
Chain, ARIZ. STATE COLL. OF Bus., SCH. OF HEALTH ADMIN. & POLICY. 1-3 (2000),
https://www.novationco.com/media/industryinfo/GroupPurchasing.pdf.
15. See St. Francis Med. Ctr. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 657 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1081 (E.D.
Mo. 2009).
16. Id. at 1105.
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participate in the bid process during that period. GPOs commonly send out a
Request for Information (RFI) to gather other market and utilization data for
their hospital members and customers. They then use a member, client, or
customer committee comprised of clinicians to evaluate the products
gathered based on agreed-upon criteria.
B. Request for Proposal
The clinical committee, which is convened by the GPO, will then review
the compiled information and develop contract requirements. Contract
terms may specif' whether the agreements will be sole source, dual source
or multi-source. Based on this feedback, the GPOs then go to the suppliers
with a Request for Proposal (RFP). During the RFP process, the GPOs
gather more information, make comments on the contract, and request
pricing information. They then receive the bids on behalf of their members
and customers. GPOs screen non-compliant bids and begin an in-depth
round of talks that include negotiations with suppliers that have responded to
the RFP. The process is entirely voluntary, conducted between highly
sophisticated parties, and may take months to complete.
C. Evaluation and Scoring
GPOs have diverse methods for evaluating GPO contract offers to
determine who will participate in the contract award process. A GPO may
use a scoring process in which about half of the score is influenced by
price. Non-financial criteria determine the other half of the score,
including: the breadth of similar products offered by the supplier, the
number of field agents to service contracts, product and patient safety
considerations, the quality of manufacturing facilities, and the amount of
product that is outsourced to third-party manufacturers.19 GPOs permit the
clinical committee to determine if any suppliers do not meet the
requirements to proceed. Some products may get special scoring because
hospital staff prefer these items. Even when clinicians decide to place a
product on contract, however, they remain free to purchase "off contract"
even when products are included on a "sole source" basis.20
17. St. Francis Med. Ctr., 657 F. Supp. 2d at 1079.
18. Id. at 1083.
19. See id.
20. Id. at 1079-81.
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Additionally, hospitals may also compete directly with GPOs. For
exam le, a large hospital or system might organize what is called a "bulk
buy." In a bulk buy, hospitals that have a budget and are willing to
purchase certain volumes may make a spot purchase, thereby obtaining a
better price point for a volume specific product purchase. GPOs will often
coordinate among multiple members and/or customers to increase the value
of the spot purchase. But other non-GPO businesses serve this market, too.22
D. Terms and Conditions
It is during this negotiation process that all terms and conditions are
worked out, including pricing, administration fees, legal matters (e.g.,
indemnification, regulatory compliance, confidentiality, etc.), and basic
business terms (e.g., failure to supply clauses, performance requirements,
etc.). GPOs and members negotiate whether the contract includes a tiered
pricing structure, which encourages members and customers to purchase a
greater product volume in exchange for a better per unit price.22 For
example, a contract could include a commitment to buy 85% of a hospital's
supplies from a given supplier in order to become eligible for a better price
than if it committed only 60%.23 Buyers frequently choose lower
commitment tiers, despite having to pay higher prices. Finally, all hospitals
and health care providers are free to make purchases "off contract."
24
E. Best and Final Offer
At the end of the negotiation process, the GPO requests best-and-final
price offers from suppliers. For example, some GPOs have a second client
committee, the Executive Steering Committee, (ESC) made up of the supply
chain heads of members or clients in large health care systems, and which
determines business strategy and awards the contracts (with the input and
recommendations from the clinical committees). In this example, the GPO
takes the completed contract to the ESC, with an analysis of key terms,
21. Id. at 1080.
22. ANDREw L WILSON, PHARM.D, AM. Soc'Y OF HEALTH SYs. PHARMACISTS,
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT FOR HEALTH-SYSTEM PHARMACISTS (2009).
23. Id. at 1081 n.19.
24. See EUGENE S. SCHNELLER, THE VALUE OF GROUP PURCHASING-2009: MEETING
THE NEED FOR STRATEGIC SAVINGS 11-12 (2009) [hereinafter SCHNELLER 2009],
https://www.novationco.com/media/industryinfo/value of gpo_2009.pdf.
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pricing impact based on historic utilization, and the ESC determines which
contracts will be awarded. At the end of the process, the hospital has a
complete schedule of prices and terms of sale for most, if not all, of the
products it uses for the next three years. The hospital can then order those
products at its convenience, subject to the terms and conditions of the
contract based on its level of commitment, without having to negotiate each
purchase individually. Since the agreements are long-term, the amount of
work saved is substantial, and the hospital can rely on the GPO to meet
fiduciary obligations to keep costs down. Researchers have found that
GPOs save between 10-15%. 5
F. Reduced Personnel Costs
In addition to cost savings derived from discounts, GPOs reduce the need
for hospitals to maintain separate supply staff. A typical hospital may have
only a handful of people to handle all their contracting requirements.
However, in order to operate, they need tens of thousands of items of
equipment, medical devices, diagnostics, therapeutics, imaging,
pharmaceuticals, food services, and bulk products, to mention a few. Large
hospital systems would have to spend as much as $600,000 per system, or
$2 billion nationally, to replace GPOs with in-house staff.2 6  In-house
hospital material management personnel focus on the highest priority
products and services. For most other products, they rely on what they can
get from distributors or from the supplier directly with a minimum of
negotiation. Using a GPO, one purchasing order can be issued where,
27
without it, 150 to 200 purchasing orders would be required. GPOs are
designed to bring the attention of competent personnel to all areas of
contracts.28
25. Lawton R. Burns & Andrew Lee, Hospital Purchasing Alliances: Utilization,
Services, and Performance, 33 HEALTH CARE MGMT. REv. 203, 205 (2008) (finding
savings of 10% to 15%); see also SCHNELLER 2009, supra note 24, at 12 (purchasing
PPI's though GPOs gave hospitals an estimated savings of 15% for orthopedic implants).
26. SCHNELLER 2009, supra note 24, at 5.
27. See id.
28. Id. at 4-5.
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G. Manage Complex Pricing and Products
GPOs may consider the Total Cost of Ownership (TCO) rather than the
price of a particular component, when reviewing bids for more complicated
purchases. For some products, prices may have more than one component
and the desirability of a product may be linked to factors besides price. For
example, a hospital buying x-ray equipment may also require a service
contract and pay separately for the hardware, software, and service. Another
device may have unique features that make it hard to compare to other
products. The hospital product device market is fractured into myriad
segments, with significant diversity, even within narrow product categories.
For example, there are numerous kinds of catheters, and selecting the right
product requires expertise. Over time, new segments emerge because of
product or technology innovations. Moreover, changing technology adds to
competitiveness and product change. Product safety, manufacturing
consistency, and a track record for consistency are other factors that a
hospital has to consider given its legal liability, regulatory concerns, and
need for long-term operational stability and quality control.
H. "Share-Backs"
At the end of the year many GPOs will often divide up the money that is
29left over after expenses and distribute it to members and/or shareholders.
The members are often the GPO's member owners or customer hospitals.
Hospitals must report these distributions to the government as an additional
reduction in the price of the product paid by the hospital. This is covered
under the discount safe harbor, which protects passing along those savings to
hospitals as long as the federal health care programs get the benefit of the
30
savings.
1. Strategic Use of GPO for Benchmarking
GPO agreements do not bind their hospital members or customers to any
single supplier. Usually, GPO agreements set terms for multiple suppliers of
competing devices. In cases where GPOs contract with a single supplier, the
hospital has at least five options for buying outside of the agreement. The
hospital can (1) work through another GPO-the average hospital has two to
four GPOs; (2) transact directly with the supplier; (3) re-offer the RFP
through a specialized reverse-auction firm; (4) use internal staff to organize
29. GAO-10-738,supra note 13, at 6.
30. Id. at 12 ("The six GPOs combined reported distributing a total of $1.1 billion in
2008, which is 53% of the total amount of revenue reported by the six GPOs.").
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a special purpose group of hospitals to make a bulk-purchase of the item
outside of the GPO setting; and, (5) buy off the shelf of a retailer or
wholesaler making an acceptable offer. 3 1
GPOs are flexible in how they work with clients. For example, Schneller
and Smeltzer identify four different types of hospital/GPO engagement,
where the hospitals use GPOs: (1) heavily for product selection and
contracts; (2) as a starting point for negotiation either directly with suppliers
or with another GPO; (3) to negotiate a special price for them; and (4) for
32
additional services such as data-mining, among others.
Additionally, there are "regional GPOs and national GPOs. There are
product specific GPOs and hospital systems that perform the role of GPOs.
Each GPO offers a different set of services." 3 3 GPOs "are also helpful in
establishing the market price for a particular product and a starting point for
negotiations for lower-priced commodity products." 34  Additionally,
hospitals can have different ownership links to GPOs, as it might be a sole
owner, part of a consortium or system, or the GPO might be entirely
independent of the hospital.
1 The CAF Transaction Fee
Vendors pay Contract Administration Fees (CAFs), or a fixed percentage
paid by the supplier to the GPO as part of closing a specific sale between
supplier and hospital. The average contract administrative fees paid by
vendors in 2008, weighted by purchasing volume, ranged from 1.22% of
customer purchases to 2.25% of purchases. These fees defray the GPOs'
cost of overhead, deal negotiation, advertisements to clients, and other
activities. The CAF offsets the cost of GPOs for: (1) maintaining staff and
offices; (2) research on products; (3) promoting products to their
31. See EUGENE S. SCHNELLER & LARRY R. SMELTZER, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT OF
THE HEALTH CARE SUPPLY CHAIN: PROGRESSIVE PRACTICES FOR HEALTH SYSTEM
LEADERS (2006) [hereinafter SCHNELLER 2006].
32. See St. Francis Med. Ctr. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 657 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1078 (E.D.
Mo. 2009).
33. SCHNELLER 2006, supra note 31.
34. Ad. at 1079.
35. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-126, MEDICARE: LACK OF PRICE
TRANSPARENCY MAY HAMPER HOSPITALS' ABILITY TO BE PRUDENT PURCHASERS OF
IMPLANTABLE MEDICAL DEVICES (2012), http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/587688.pdf.
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membership; and (4) advising hospitals on the most economical way to use
the products.
The CAF payment is collected by the GPO only after a supplier and
hospital enter into a fixed-quantity transaction under the terms of an existing
GPO-negotiated contract. Thus, the CAF can be understood as a kind of
transaction fee that becomes due only when an invoice is paid, sometimes 90
days after the underlying transaction, and perhaps years after the "umbrella"
contractual agreement was executed. Depending on GPO ownership
structure and terms of membership agreements, some or all of the CAF may
be returned to the hospital as a distribution. 3 6 These distributions must be
reported to Medicare and other government payors as they reduce
Medicare's reimbursement to the hospital.37
This system forces the GPO and supplier to negotiate an agreement,
including CAFs, that attracts the most clients through lower prices and better
terms and conditions. If the umbrella agreement is not attractive, GPO
clients have the option to shop around for a better deal. Most hospitals use
two or more GPOs, and therefore, clients usually are able to shop between
GPO portfolios for better prices.3 The CAF value generated for the GPO is
a direct effect of its negotiated contracts and their attractiveness to clients.
The willingness of a supplier to pay a higher CAF is based on the credibility
of the GPO in getting clients to use its contracts. A GPO that has members
or clients that do not use its contracts will obtain neither competitive prices
nor fees. The actual quantity of goods transacted is not known at the time
that the overall agreement is negotiated, and the fee amount is set and paid
only after a GPO client actually places an order with the supplier. Any
uncompetitive offers made by one GPO will be an opportunity for another
GPO to take its business.
II. THE LITAN, SINGER, BIRKENBACH STUDY
The authors rely on data gathered by a medical device auction provider
that offers reverse auctions to hospitals seeking to purchase durable
36. St. Francis Med. Ctr., 657 F. Supp. 2d at 1083.
39. Interestingly, the CAF also serves an economic function. As discussed in recent
literature, transaction taxes tend to reduce price volatility in a market by restraining
speculation. In the GPO market, the extra cost of the transaction fee may prevent
hospitals from attempting to "arbitrage" their discounts by, for example, re-selling
products bought under their GPO umbrella agreements to "free-riders" outside of the
GPO system.
38. St. Francis Med. Ctr., 657 F. Supp. 2d at 1079.
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equipment and capital goods. 39 The items sold at auction were generally
high value items known as capital equipment that make up approximately
20% of the total GPO market. The database consists of "approximately
8,100 aftermarket transactions," in which the winning GPO price was put up
for bid after the initial GPO auction.40 The report then states several claims
based on this research. The transactions data suggest that, when exposed to
competition in the aftermarket, "hospitals were able to achieve average
savings of approximately 10 to 14 percent across the entire database (2001
through 2010) and a savings of 15 percent on average for 2010 data." 41
One major methodological concern with the authors' work is that the GPO
baseline numbers appear to be inaccurate. For example, the data does not
appear to include information about GPO "sharebacks" to hospital members
that affect the end-cost of the product. In fairness, this would probably be
impossible to do because of the inherent difficulty of properly attributing
"sharebacks" to a specific device purchase. Without accounting for
"sharebacks," however, there is a substantial probability that the GPO
baseline is too high.
A. Lack ofRandomization
The data compiled here are vulnerable to bias against GPOs for several
reasons. The auctions are based on transactions of large, high-value
products, which, as previously stated, make up only a fraction of the GPO
market, for which prices are typically more negotiable. Even if the data
were accurate, however, it is unsurprising that suppliers would give a better
price negotiating directly with a hospital that is 100% committed to buy the
device. By contrast, GPOs typically negotiate on behalf of a number of
hospitals for more indefinite quantities. Also, the aftermarket transactions in
the paper occur in a segment of the market where quantities tend to be
definite by nature (i.e., as with big-ticket imaging items). In a single-unit
quantity after-market transaction (e.g., MRI scanner, etc.), the commitment
to the supplier is always 100% and hence, a lower price would be expected.
Think of selling a house. The purchaser typically pays the seller less than
the public offer amount advertised by the broker. It is rarely the case that
the buyer pays more, and that usually happens during a speculative bubble
before brokers have reset their pricing method to account for a "hot" market.
The motivation for the seller to reduce price for an eager, qualified buyer is
39. Litan, Singer & Birkenbach, supra note 1, at 28 n.27.
40. Id. at 29.
41. Id.at28-29.
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to reduce their own opportunity costs while waiting for a higher bid.
Another factor to consider may be the intensity of the bidder. A definite
quantity contract with a specific hospital might have substantially more
private value to a supplier trying to "break in" to a new hospital market than
an umbrella agreement with multiple hospitals.
B. Bidders and Offerors are Self-Selected
Since the aftermarket auction always occurred after the GPO negotiation,
it is reasonable to assume that neither the prospective buyer nor the supplier
would make an aftermarket bid unless they both thought they could surpass
the GPO benchmark. Therefore, both the buyers and suppliers are self-
selecting in the sense that they all believe they can do better than the
benchmark and are committed to the trade. Conversely, the population that
bids in the GPO market did not have a benchmark or special commitment
from which to begin negotiations. Consequently, a GPO benchmark bid for
an expensive piece of imaging equipment might be high since it is made
without a firm commitment to purchase a specific package of gear,
maintenance coverage, and technical support. By getting down to specifics
in the aftermarket negotiation, there is plenty of room for supplier and buyer
to get better terms by shifting the many variables in play. The same
dynamic would not apply to simpler equipment and supplies. In summary,
the statistics provided are comparing two entirely different types of market
participants in a way that is biased against GPOs. 2
C. Generalization of the Data
Because the authors do not provide the data used in this paper, we assume
the data presented here is the same as the authors' previous work. The
regressions displayed in the Appendix of that paper appear to show that
price reductions were significant in only five out of twenty categories of
products in the auctions. As noted before, the auctions covered a range of
high-end products that make up only about twenty percent of the GPO
market.4 Because the data include only a particular type of product
category, which constitutes only a small portion of the GPO market, the data
presented are not representative of the whole GPO market.
42. Schneller documents cases where hospitals appear to "cherry-pick" those
transactions when they want to use GPO contracts versus when they prefer to negotiate
their own deals and use the GPOs terms as a ceiling.
43. Litan, Singer, & Birkenbach, supra note 1, at 49.
44. See Press Release, Med. Device Mfrs. Ass'n, supra note 4.
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D. The Economic Critique
The authors' economic critique is that GPOs benefit from uncompetitive
markets. We posit, however, that the opposite is true because competitive
markets generate more income for GPOs. It has been established that a
monopoly or uncompetitive market is less profitable for an agent, because
the agent shoulders the cost of the deadweight loss generated by the
uncompetitive market as well as the excess profit. 45 It is worth noting that
the excess profit does not compensate for lost sales, due to lack of
competition and excessively high prices. The market for hospital goods is a
fiercely competitive market. If a GPO does not offer good product at price,
hospitals can: (1) use another GPO (hospitals usually belong to two or more
GPOs); (2) hire another GPO; and (3) complete a transaction outside of the
GPO market.
To test the logic of this argument, we posit the reverse case: assume GPOs
have an incentive to negotiate higher prices as Litan and Singer have
claimed. If a GPO gets three dollars for a 3% fee on a $100 purchase, the
GPO will want to get six dollars by negotiating a price of $200. However,
this argument assumes that purchase patterns are entirely static and that a
hospital will always purchase X number of units from Supplier Y and has no
opportunity or incentive to purchase fewer units from Supplier Y or to
purchase more units from Supplier Z. From the GPO perspective, under the
old contract, they sold 100,000 units at $100 each, and received fees of
$300,000. If the GPO negotiates an additional 5% reduction in the unit
price, from $100 to $95, it can attract more contracts usage. If clients
purchase the same amount of units, then the GPO will be down $15,000. If
the clients increase their usage by 10%, to 100,000 units, then the GPO will
receive $313,500 in fees. In other words, the volume of sales determines the
level of fees paid to a GPO just as much as the size of the fee. By
negotiating an additional 5% discount, the GPO's clients need only increase
their utilization by 5.3% for the fees generated to remain the same for the
GPO.
E. Deadweight
The idea that GPOs could profit from encouraging a product market that is
uncompetitive, as the authors have suggested here, is theoretically and
mathematically improbable. A GPO that takes a fixed percentage of
revenues will earn more from a competitive market operating at competitive
equilibrium levels than it could from an uncompetitive market. Such
markets have high prices and create big pools of unmet demand called
45. See generally GAO-10-738, supra note 13.
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"deadweight loss." 46 This deadweight loss is shouldered by intermediaries
who profit by taking a fixed percentage from each transaction, similar to the
GPOs. Otherwise, higher prices always mean less quantity sold, ceteris
paribus, and hence less profit for the GPO.
Comparison of Fixed Percentage Commission Under
Monopoly and Competitive Equilibrium Conditions
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Figure 1: Under a competitive market, revenue is maximized at the
competitive equilibrium price and quantity (CE) in the left hand
graphic. In a monopoly market (the most extreme uncompetitive
market) represented on the right hand side as a darker area with
equilibrium price ME the constant percentage Monopoly Commission is
smaller than the CE Commission in the competitive scenario on the left.
This is because the quantity supplied at the monopoly price level is
smaller than the quantity supplied at the CE. The left graph represents
46. HAL R. VARIAN, MICROECONoMIC ANALYSIS 229 (3d ed. 1992).
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a competitive market where CE represents a competitive outcome: Q=1
and P=1 for total revenue of 1. In the right-hand box, the underlying
gray area is, in fact, equal to the left-hand box. The CE Commission
area represents a 20% on the old revenue, or about 0.2 currency units
profit. In the ME area, the monopolist has curtailed production to
Q=0.5, and the price has gone up to ME price of 2. This means revenue
is now 0.5 currency unit, and the 20% profit has shrunk to 0.1 currency
unit.
III. A PUBLIC POLICY ALTERNATIVE WORTH INVESTIGATING
A recent report by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO)
shows that medical device pricing secrecy impedes the ability of hospitals
and GPOs to achieve the best possible prices. The report states that the
medical device industry has successfully inserted "gag clauses" into their
sales contracts with hospitals related to physician preference items. These
gag clauses mask the true cost of medical devices. The report suggests this
practice results in higher costs across the board, as hospitals routinely
overpay for equipment because medical device prices are not disclosed. As
a result, some hospitals unnecessarily pay thousands of dollars more than
others for high-cost medical devices, such as defibrillators, stents, and hip
replacements. Because of these contract provisions, and some additional
factors such as the supplier-physician relationship, neither GPOs nor an
aftermarket auction provider is able to provide the best value for their
hospital customers. Therefore, at a time when all parties to the health care
system are trying to rein in spending, Congress should take steps to enact a
pro-market solution to this problem and prohibit contractual gag clauses in
order to increase price transparency in the medical device marketplace. 4
IV. CONCLUSION
The authors do not meet their burden of proof because they do not offer an
adequate opportunity for the examination of the data used in their study -an
opportunity we would have gladly pursued. We also believe that the authors
are hasty in providing their public policy suggestions. Cost pressures on
hospitals will only increase in the future as the baby boomer generation ages
and promises to place more pressure on the nation's health care system. The
new health care reform bill is funded, in part, by a $500 billion-plus
reduction in Medicare services paid to hospitals and health care providers.
Other related reforms will require hospitals to pay more attention to the cost-
effectiveness of their operations. GPOs are well-positioned to do so.
47. See generally id.
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Aftermarket auctions may also provide value to hospitals looking for
additional cost containment strategies. These strategies are not mutually
exclusive and do not require public policy changes as have been suggested.
Congress should, however, examine the implications of the GAO's recent
findings related to the lack of price transparency in the implantable medical
device market. It is clearly in the interest of all parties to the health care
delivery system to have our health care markets work as competitively as
possible.
